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Abstract
This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of coopera-
tive behaviour in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional
as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the im-
portance of anger and its role in motivating individuals to punish free
riders. However, we find that anger also triggers retaliatory behaviour
by the punished individuals. This makes the enforcement of a coop-
erative norm more costly. We show that in addition to anger, ‘social’
emotions like guilt need to be present for punishment to be an effective
deterrent of uncooperative actions. They play a key role by subduing
the desire of punished individuals to retaliate and by motivating them
to behave more cooperatively in the future.
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An important mechanism for the promotion of cooperation is the enforcement
of social norms (Ostrom, 1998; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 20000a; Boyd and Richer-
son, 2005). As shown by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000b), cooperative behaviour
can persist when there is an opportunity to punish defectors. However, al-
though punishment can have desirable consequences, it can also have negative
effects. For example, punishment can crowd out positive reciprocity (Fehr
and Rockenbach, 2003), lead to welfare losses (Egas and Riedl, 2005), and
sometimes produce only a negligible increase in cooperation levels (Ga¨chter
and Herrmann, 2006; Nikiforakis and Normann, forthcoming). Studying the
choices of individuals who punish as well as the reaction of those who are
punished can help us predict in which situations punishment produces neg-
ative results. Considering the role of emotions seems to be necessary to
understand this kind of behaviour (Loewenstein, 1996; Elster, 1999; Thaler,
2000).
The goal of this paper is to understand the type of motivations that must
be present, among both the punishers and the punished, for punishment to be
an effective institution for the promotion of cooperation. We concentrate on
the role of social emotions, such as shame and guilt, as an essential component
for the successful enforcement of cooperative norms. In particular, we are
interested in their role as inhibitors of retaliatory behaviour by the punished
individuals.
Although it has attracted little attention, antisocial behaviour such as
retaliation or the punishment of cooperative individuals has been often ob-
served in laboratory experiments, including, for example, public good games
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000b; Nikiforakis, 2008), prisoner dilemma games (Falk
et al., 2005), and moonlighting games (Abbink etal., 2000). This type of be-
haviour is widespread and is observed in around one quarter of all subjects
(e.g., Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Falk et al., 2008).
We study, by means of an experiment, antisocial behaviour in a social
dilemma game. We introduce a punishment institution where individuals
who are punished always have the opportunity to retaliate. After all, if a
punishment technology exists, it is likely that both the punisher and the
punished have access to it. Our results show that many individuals do re-
taliate after being punished. In various cases, this escalates as individuals
punish each other in turns. In order to observe the effect of retaliation on
future behaviour, subjects played the game twice. We find that although
retaliation considerably increases the cost of punishing selfish behaviour, it
does not deter future cooperation or punishment. Hence, its effect seems to
be restricted to welfare losses caused by the destruction of resources.
Recent research has revealed that emotions motivate individuals to pun-
ish opportunistic behaviour. In particular, anger has been shown to be of
influence when subjects have to decide whether to punish or not. Unkind
behaviour induces anger, and the angrier people are the more likely they are
to incur costs in order to penalize such behaviour (Bosman and van Winden,
2002; Quervain et al., 2004). We replicate these findings and extend this line
of research by studying the emotional reaction of punished individuals.
In order to explain the behaviour of both punishers and punished, we
measure their emotional response. Our results show that individuals who act
in an unkindly manner do nevertheless feel angry when punished. Further-
more, we find that high intensities of anger are related to positive retaliation.
Consequently, anger alone induces multiple rounds of punishment and a sig-
nificant destruction of resources. Therefore, anger cannot explain whether
punishment will effectively promote prosocial behaviour. The effectiveness
of punishment depends on the reaction of the individuals who are punished.
What is missing to make punishment effective is a ‘moral’ reaction of
the punished. Namely, after receiving punishment the punished individual
should act more cooperatively and abstain from retaliation. We show that the
social emotions of shame and guilt motivate individuals to react in precisely
this way. In other words, individuals do not retaliate when feelings of guilt
restrain their anger-induced desire to fight back.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we describe the exper-
iment’s design. Section 2 describes the subjects’ behaviour. In Section 3
we analyze the relationship between the emotions and the behaviour of the
punishers and the punished. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
1 Experimental Design
Lately, punishment mechanisms have been mostly analyzed in the context of
public good games (using the design of Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000b). However,
in this study we use a simpler setting where the causes and effects of emotions
can be easily observed and analyzed. To study the impact of social emotions,
we used a two-person social dilemma game with and without punishment
opportunities. Our game is similar to many of the social dilemma games
in the literature, such as, the sequential prisoners’ dilemma, the trust game
(Berg et al., 1995), the gift exchange game (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr et al., 1993)
and others.
1.1 The Game
We first describe the baseline game without punishment opportunities and
then we explain how punishment is introduced. The game consists of two
players, a ‘first mover’ and a ‘second mover’, taking part in a one-shot game
(see Figure 1). At the start of the game, the first mover receives 150 points
and the second mover 100 points. In the first stage, the first mover decides to
either defect or cooperate. If the first mover defects, he keeps his 150 points,
the second mover keeps her 100 points, and the game ends. If the first mover
cooperates, 50 of his 150 points are multiplied by six and transferred to the
second mover (i.e. the second mover receives 300 points). In the second stage,
the second mover returns either 150 points (an equal split of the gains), 50
points (returning exactly the points lost by the first mover), or 0 points.
After the decision of the second mover the game ends. Hence, if the first
mover cooperates his payoff is pi1 = 100 + r and the payoff of the second
mover is pi2 = 100+6× 50− r where r is the amount returned by the second
mover.
— Figure 1 around here —
In the game with punishment both players can assign punishment points.
We denote pit as the amount of points assigned by player i in punishment
round t. After the second mover decides how much to return, the first round
of punishment starts. First, the first mover has the opportunity to assign
punishment points to the second mover (p11 ≥ 0). Every point assigned costs
1 point to the first mover and reduces the payoff of the second mover by 4
points. In order to avoid losses during the experiment, the first mover can
assign punishment points only as long as the second mover has a positive
number of points (i.e. 1
4
(100 + 6× 50− r) ≥ p11). If the first mover chooses
p11 = 0 the game ends. However, if the first mover chooses p11 > 0 the
second mover is given the opportunity to assign punishment points to the
first mover (p21). In order to avoid confusion, we will refer to punishment by
the second mover as retaliation. Punishment by first movers and retaliation
by second movers has the same cost and does the same amount of harm.
Thus for each retaliation point assigned, the first mover loses four points.
Once more, the second mover can assign retaliation points only as long the
first mover has a positive number of points (i.e. 1
4
(100 + r − p11) ≥ p21).
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If p21 = 0 the game ends, but if p21 > 0 the game continues to a second
round of punishment. That is, the first mover has the opportunity to assign
additional punishment points to the second mover (p12). As before, if p12 = 0
the game ends but if p12 > 0, the second mover has the opportunity to assign
additional retaliation points (p22), and so on. The process repeats itself until
either one of the players has zero points and cannot be punished further,
or one of the players assigns zero punishment points. Therefore, if the first
mover cooperates his payoff is pi1 = 100 + r−
∑
t p1t − 4×
∑
t p2t and that of
the second mover is pi2 = 100 + 6× 50− r −
∑
t p2t − 4×
∑
t p1t.
If we use the standard assumption of rational individuals with self-regarding
preferences, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game with
and without punishment is for second movers to return zero points and thus
for first movers not to cooperate (since punishment is always costly, it is
not credible at any stage). The predictions can change if individuals possess
other-regarding preferences such as a concern for unequal payoffs, efficient
outcomes, and/or reciprocating kind and unkind actions (e.g., Rabin, 1993;
Fehr and Schmidt; 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin,
2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2005; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). In
the game without punishment, if the frequency of selfish individuals is suf-
ficiently low then there can be equilibria where some second movers return
positive amounts and some first movers cooperate. In the game with pun-
ishment, in addition to individuals who are willing to act kindly, there might
be individuals who are willing to punish selfish behaviour. If the expecta-
tion of punishment leads to higher returns from the second movers, then
first movers have an additional incentive to cooperate.2 Certainly, the first
movers’ willingness to punish depends on the amount of retaliation by second
movers, which in turn depends on the willingness of first movers to punish
once again, and so on. This, in our opinion is a more realistic way of model-
ing social punishment. If both the punisher and the punished have access to
the punishment technology, the punished will always have the opportunity to
retaliate. Moreover, both players have the option to avoid further interaction
by deciding not to punish and thus ending the game. To our knowledge, no
other study examines punishment behaviour in such a setting.3
1.2 Measurement of Emotions
During the experiment participants were presented with a number of ques-
tionnaires concerning emotions and evaluations of expectations and fairness.
Emotions were measured on a seven-point scale4 after subjects observed the
choice of the other player but before they made their own choice. The list
of measured emotions included: anger, gratitude, guilt, happiness, irritation,
shame, and surprise. Expectations about the behaviour of the other player
were measured by asking for a point estimate of the most likely action (this
was done after the subjects made their decision but before they observed
the other player’s choice). Fairness perceptions were measured on a seven-
point scale at the end of the experiment in the debriefing questionnaire (see
Appendix A).
Despite their widespread use in social psychology and some areas of eco-
nomics, such as research on happiness (e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Kah-
neman and Krueger, 2006) and trust (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000), the use of
self reports is sometimes regarded with suspicion by experimental economists
(Smith and Walker, 1993). This suspicion is warranted when individual in-
centives are not aligned with truthful reporting. An example is voluntary
contributions to public goods, where self reports will often overstate the true
amount that individuals are willing to pay (Murphy et al., 2005). Self reports
are further not applicable in situations where participants are not aware of
their own motivations or goals but are asked to describe them.5 To incen-
tivize truthful reports, many ingenious techniques have been developed, for
example by paying subjects depending on the accuracy of their expectations
(Murphy and Winkler, 1970). However these methods require a measure of
accuracy, which is not always available.
Since emotions are internal, difficult to observe states, self reports of emo-
tions are an often used technique in social psychology (Robinson and Clore,
2002). Psychological research has shown that self reports of emotional ex-
periences are consistently correlated with a number of different physiological
measures (e.g. heart rate and facial muscle activity see, Bradley and Lang,
2000). In experimental economics self reports of anger have been related to
skin conductance levels for emotional reactions in the power to take game
(Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007). Physiological measures are however difficult to
apply to social emotions (Adolphs, 2002). To quote Tangney and Dearing
(2002): “Shame and guilt are internal affective states that are difficult, if
not impossible, to asses directly. For example, unlike most of the ‘primary’
emotions (e.g., anger, sadness, joy), shame and guilt do not involve clearly
definable, codable facial expressions [...]. There is no clear-cut ‘guilt’ expres-
sion, nor a readily recognizable ‘shame’ expression”. It is therefore considered
that the best way to measure guilt and shame are self reports. That these
are indeed reliable can be deduced from a recent neuroimaging study (Taka-
hashi et al., 2004) that showed correlations of self reported guilt ratings and
activation of theory of mind related brain areas (i.e. medial prefrontal cortex
and posterior superior temporal sulcus).6
For all these reasons, we believe that self-reports of emotions are reli-
able with respect to our research questions. Concerning social emotions they
clearly are the preferred measurement method. In addition, since we concen-
trate on relative differences in emotional reactions, a general bias in a given
direction will not affect our results. Lastly, to avoid focusing subjects on a
specific emotion and to limit post-rationalization, we confront subjects with
a number of different emotions, which they rate before making their decision.
2 Observed Behaviour
In total 162 students participated in the experiment (26 in the baseline treat-
ment and 136 in the punishment treatment). Approximately 54% were stu-
dents of economics and the rest came from a variety of fields. The average
age was 22 years and 58% of the participants were male. Each subject played
twice the social dilemma game (we refer to each play as part 1 or part 2). We
used a perfect strangers matching protocol to avoid any reputation effects.
The average earnings were 10.55 euros. The experimental procedures as well
as the instructions are found in Appendix A.
In this section, we give an overview and a brief discussion of the be-
haviour of first and second movers. A summary of the behavioural data can
be found in Appendix B. We start by investigating how often first movers
cooperate and how much second movers return. Comparing the baseline and
the punishment treatments allows us to observe the effect of the punishment
institution on the subjects’ behaviour. Then, in order to explain any dif-
ferences induced by punishment, we analyze the punishment behaviour of
first movers as well as the retaliatory behaviour of second movers. Finally,
we examine whether punishment and retaliation in part 1 have an effect on
their behaviour in part 2.
2.1 Cooperation and Returns
Figure 2 summarizes the main differences between the baseline and the pun-
ishment treatment. Namely, first movers cooperate more often and second
movers return more in the presence of punishment.
— Figure 2 around here —
As can be seen in Figure 2A, in both treatments, almost all first movers
cooperate in the first part (more than 84.6%). However, in the absence
of punishment, cooperation decreases substantially in the second part. In
contrast, if the opportunity to punish others exists, first movers cooperate
equally often in both parts. Testing for differences between treatments con-
firms this observation. There is no significant difference in the frequency of
cooperation in the first part (p = 0.90) but a highly significant difference
in the second part (p = 0.02).7 There is an even starker difference between
treatments when we consider the behaviour of second movers. In part 1
and 2, second movers return noticeably less in the absence of punishment
(p = 0.01 and p = 0.07).
Given the behaviour of second movers, it is easy to understand the de-
crease in cooperation in the baseline treatment. Remember that first movers
who cooperate send 50 points. In the baseline treatment, they receive on av-
erage a smaller amount in return. In contrast, first movers who cooperate in
the punishment treatment receive back roughly twice the amount sent. Thus,
even when it is possible to retaliate, punishment limits the opportunistic be-
haviour of second movers and helps sustain high cooperation levels. It is still
a puzzle, however, why first movers do not foresee the low returns of second
movers in the first part of the baseline treatment. This could be the result
of subjects forming overoptimistic beliefs concerning the cooperativeness of
others due to the similarity between the experiment and common everyday
interactions in which cooperation is an equilibrium (e.g. due to punishment
or repeated play).8
In spite of more cooperation, punishment did not lead to overall higher
earnings. In part 1, the average earnings of all participants are actually higher
in the baseline treatment (230.8 vs. 189.0 points), whereas in part 2, average
earnings are higher in the punishment treatment (187.3 vs. 182.7 points).
In neither case is the difference significant (p > 0.23). In the following
paragraphs, we examine how subjects punish and retaliate.
2.2 Punishment and Retaliation
As Figure 3A illustrates (see also Table B1), a large number of subjects
are willing to spend some or all of their earnings in order to punish second
movers or to retaliate against first movers. In the cases where the second
mover returned less than 150 points, about two thirds end up in punishment
(68.1%). Retaliation against first movers is common but somewhat less fre-
quent (40.0%). We even observe that a large fraction (55.6%) of first movers
who had the opportunity to punish once again decide to do so (we refer to
this as ‘additional punishment’).9
Figure 3B shows that the amount spent on punishment by first movers
who got back less than 150 points was clearly higher than the amount spent
on retaliation by second movers who got punished (p = 0.01). Surely, this
is partly explained by the fact that the earnings of first movers when they
faced retaliation were lower than the earnings of second movers when they
faced punishment. Therefore, since the amount of punishment or retaliation
is limited by the earnings of the other player, first movers were able to spend
more on reducing the other’s payoff. Still, if we normalize both punishment
and retaliation using the maximum amount of points that an individual could
assign to the other, we see that first movers are more aggressive punishers
than second movers (p = 0.09).
— Figure 3 around here —
Although it is not predicted by traditional economic theory (assuming
own-payoff maximization), the punishment behaviour of first movers has been
observed in similar experiments (see, Camerer, 2003). Also in parallel with
other experimental findings, we observe that the amount and frequency of
punishment increases as the amount returned decreases. First movers who
received 150 points punish less than first movers who received 50 or 0 points
(in each part p < 0.01). Comparing first movers who received 50 points with
those who received 0 points shows that the latter punish significantly more
only in the second part (p = 0.02, otherwise p > 0.28).
We find more intriguing the willingness of second movers to retaliate.
After all, these subjects had behaved in an unkindly manner by returning
less than 150 points. Furthermore, when they had to decide whether they
wanted to retaliate, 65.0% of the second movers had equal or higher earnings
than the first mover. It is remarkable that 7 (i.e. 53.8%) of these 13 sec-
ond movers chose a positive amount of retaliation.10 Unlike for first movers,
the retaliatory behaviour of second movers does not seem to depend on the
actions of the other player.11 For instance, there is no significant difference
in the amount or the frequency of retaliation between second movers who
received a large amount of punishment and second movers who received a
small amount (above or below median punishment, p > 0.50).
It is instructive to calculate how retaliation affects the first movers’ ‘real’
cost of punishment. Whenever first movers punish, they not only incur the
cost of reducing the second mover’s earnings, but they also risk further losses
if the second mover decides to retaliate.12 If there is no retaliation, the cost
of punishment is 0.250 points per point reduced. Including the actual losses
due to retaliation increases the average costs of punishment to 0.399 points
per point reduced. Nonetheless, even though this is a substantial increase
of 59.4%, punishment can still be considered an inexpensive tool for the re-
duction of the second mover’s earnings. This might explain why cooperation
is sustained in spite of frequent retaliation. However, more generally the
impact of retaliation on the costs of punishment will depend on the game
played and its parameters. It is possible that in some cases retaliation will
drive the costs of punishment to the point where punishment fails to sustain
cooperation.13 A similar analysis for the real cost of retaliation (given losses
due to additional punishment) gives that second movers incur a cost of 1.013
points per point reduced. This remarkable 305.6% cost increase might ex-
plain why second movers punish less aggressively than first movers do. We
now turn to how first and second movers adjust their behaviour from part 1
to part 2.
2.3 Dynamics
As already noted, the starkest difference between treatments concerning the
behaviour of first movers is the large decrease in cooperation from part 1 to
part 2 in the baseline treatment compared to the punishment treatment. On
closer inspection, this difference is due to two reasons. First, as shown in Fig-
ure 4A, in the baseline treatment 66.7% of the first movers who got back less
than 150 points in part 1 defected in part 2. In contrast, in the punishment
treatment it was only 19.0% (the difference is significant, p = 0.04). Sec-
ond, in the baseline treatment more second movers chose to return less than
150 points (81.8% in the baseline treatment vs. 35.6% in the punishment
treatment, p = 0.01). Hence, it appears that punishment has two desirable
effects. On one hand, second movers anticipate punishment and as a result
increase the amount returned. On the other hand, after experiencing self-
ish behaviour, first movers are more willing to keep on cooperating if they
have the opportunity to punish. In fact, if we examine how first movers in
the punishment treatment adjust their behaviour, we find that, among first
movers who receive less than 150 points, those who punish seem to be more
likely to cooperate once again than those who did not punish (see Figure
4B).
— Figure 4 about here —
We now turn to the effects of punishment on the future behaviour of sec-
ond movers. If we concentrate on second movers who had a good chance
of being punished (i.e. those who returned less than 150), we find that, on
average, second movers who were not punished decrease the amount returned
by 25.0 points whereas those who were punished increase it by 10.0 points
(p = 0.22). Hence, although actual punishment does promote prosocial be-
haviour, the effect is not particularly strong. In other words, punishment has
a bigger impact by deterring second movers from returning low amounts in
the first place than by increasing the returns of those who behave selfishly in
spite of the threat of punishment. For example, if none of the second movers
who returned a low amount had been punished in period 1, the average return
in period 2 would have been 87.7 points (instead of 96.6 points). In contrast,
if the threat of punishment had not been there at all then the average return
would have been as in the baseline treatment (i.e. 41.7 points).
Lastly, we analyze the impact of retaliation on both future cooperation
and punishment by first movers. In general, retaliation in part 1 does not
deter first movers from cooperating in part 2. For instance, among first
movers who punished a low return in part 1, those who received retaliation
were as likely to cooperate in part 2 as those who received no retaliation
(p = 0.64). It is also the case that retaliation does not deter first movers from
punishing. Among the first movers who punished in part 1 and then received
a low return in part 2, those who had received positive retaliation punished
in part 2 as often as those who had received no retaliation (p = 0.80). In
fact, they punished as often as those who received a low return in part 2 after
they had received a high return in part 1 (p = 0.36). The main findings from
the behavioural data are summarized in the following result:
Result 1: In the presence of punishment opportunities, cooperation is
sustained at high levels. This is because, second movers return more, and first
movers who punish do not stop cooperating after experiencing opportunistic
behaviour. Punishment of opportunistic behaviour is common and persistent
despite the fact that in numerous cases punishment leads to retaliation by
second movers.
3 Emotions and Behaviour
In the following section we investigate the relationship between the subjects’
behaviour and their emotional response. To begin, we concentrate on the
emotions of first movers, and particularly on the relationship between anger
and punishment. Subsequently, we analyze what triggers first movers to feel
high intensities of anger. We then turn to study the emotional reaction of
second movers. First, we investigate the relationship between guilt and the
second movers’ decision to retaliate. Second, we try to determine what causes
second movers to feel guilt.
— Table 1 about here —
Throughout the section, we report the results of tests done with the
emotion of anger and the emotion of guilt. However, we should note that we
find very similar results and significance levels if we substitute anger with
irritation or (lack of) happiness, or if we substitute guilt with shame. This
hints at the possibility that some of these emotions are in fact measuring
the same underlying effect. To confirm whether this is the case we applied
principal factor analysis to the emotions data.14 As can be seen in Table 1,
we find three factors that summarize the subjects’ emotional response. For
both first and second movers, the first factor can be interpreted as anger-
like emotions and the second factor as guilt-like emotions.15 It is interesting
to note that the subjects’ negative emotional response is described by these
two factors. This indicates that, in the experiment, the experience of guilt
and shame is distinct from other negative emotions and is not a reflection of
a more general negative mood. Furthermore, as argued by Zeelenberg and
Pieters (2006), it gives support to a more complex view of emotions than a
one-dimensional positive-negative scale (as is implied in many studies e.g.,
Kahneman, 1999).
3.1 Anger and Punishment
Throughout the experiment, anger is clearly related to the punishment deci-
sion. As is illustrated in Figure 5, first movers who were angry after observing
the amount returned by the second mover punish more than first movers who
were not angry (p < 0.01 in both parts).16 Furthermore, although there are
few observations, a similar pattern is observed in the second punishment
round. On average, after observing the amount of retaliation assigned to
them, first movers who felt angry punish more than first movers who did
not feel as angry (p = 0.11 for the amount of additional punishment and
p = 0.41 for its frequency). As one might expect, neither surprise nor the
social emotions of guilt nor shame are related to the first movers punishment
decision.
— Figure 5 about here —
Having found that punishment is related to experienced anger, the ques-
tion arises what explains the different intensities of anger (the emotional
reaction of first movers to the amount returned can be found in Appendix
B). In both treatments, the most important trigger of high intensities of anger
is simply receiving back less than 150 points. First movers who received 150
points felt lower intensities of anger than first movers who received either 50
or 0 points (p = 0.01, see Table B3). It is also the case that first movers who
received 0 points back were angrier than those who received 50 points back
(p = 0.03).
In addition to the amount returned, the first movers’ expectations have an
effect on the intensity of anger. In particular, first movers who overestimated
the amount returned by the second mover tended to be angrier than first
movers who underestimated it. For example, if we control for the amount
that was actually returned by concentrating on first movers who got back 50
points, we find that first movers who were expecting back 150 points were
angrier than first movers who were expecting back 50 or 0 points (p = 0.01).
Lastly, we also observe that the amount of anger experienced by first
movers is related to their fairness perceptions. First movers who thought it
is unfair to return low amounts were angrier than those who thought that it
is fair to return low amounts (below or above median fairness). For instance,
if we look again only at first movers who got back 50 points, we find that first
movers who thought returning 50 was unfair were angrier than first movers
who thought returning 50 was fair (p = 0.01).
We get similar results in a regression. Specifically, we estimate anger using
the amount returned, the expected amount returned, the perceived fairness
of returning 50 points, and some demographic variables. We find first movers
feel angrier the less is returned. Especially if they were expecting a return of
150 points or considered low returns to be very unfair (see Table C1).
Focusing on the emotional reaction of first movers to the amount of retal-
iation received from the second mover gives a comparable finding. Namely,
first movers who faced no retaliation experienced lower intensities of anger
than first movers who faced positive retaliation (p = 0.04, see Table B4).
Unfortunately, in this case we do not have enough observations to test for
the effects of expectations and fairness perceptions. These findings are sum-
marized in the following result.
Result 2: First movers who punish do so because they are angry. High
intensities of anger are triggered by selfish behaviour by the second mover,
especially if it is unexpected and considered unfair. Retaliation by second
movers also makes first movers angry and leads to additional punishment.
3.2 Guilt and Retaliation
We now turn to the relationship between the emotions and behaviour of
second movers (the emotional reaction of second movers can be found in
Table B5). We find that feelings of guilt are clearly related to retaliation. In
particular, second movers who felt no guilt are more likely to retaliate than
other second movers. Furthermore, we also find that, for second movers who
were punished, experiencing guilt induces them to correct their behaviour.
For anger-like negative emotions as well as the positive emotions, there no
direct relationship with retaliation. However as will be explained below, this
might be due to the effect of guilt itself.
As can be seen in Figure 6, second movers who felt no guilt after being
punished are more likely to retaliate than second movers who felt guilty
(p = 0.04). We also get a similar result if we test for differences in the
amount of points spent on retaliation (p = 0.08).
— Figure 6 about here —
The effect of guilt can be further described if we analyze the interaction
of guilt and anger. Given that anger motivates first movers to punish, one
could think that, if second movers get angry when they are punished, anger
could motivate second movers to retaliate. Indeed, a simple look at the
relationship between anger and retaliation suggests that second movers who
are angry retaliate more often than second movers who are not angry (see
Figure 6). However, these differences are not significant (p = 0.77 for the
differences in the amount of retaliation and p = 0.82 for the differences in
frequency).
Examining the interaction of anger and guilt clarifies why some of the
angry second movers do not retaliate. Second movers who were angry and
felt no guilt retaliate more frequently than second movers who were angry
and felt guilt (p = 0.02 and p = 0.02). For second movers who were not angry,
there are no significant differences between those who felt no guilt and those
who did (p > 0.79). Hence, guilt appears to influence the behaviour of second
movers by suppressing their anger-induced desire to retaliate.
In addition to retaliation, guilt seems to be related to how second movers
adjust their behaviour from part 1 to part 2. In Section 2 it was shown that
second movers who were punished tend to return more in the subsequent
part than second movers who were not punished. However, this effect is
not very strong. The emotional reaction of second movers hints that the
propensity of second movers to adjust their behaviour after being punished
depends on whether they felt guilty or not. On average, second movers who
felt guilt after being punished increase the amount returned by 50.0 points
whereas those who felt no guilt decrease the amount returned by 9.1 points
(p = 0.11). Next, we explain the differences in the intensities of anger and
guilt experienced by second movers.
The most important reason why second movers get angry is simply receiv-
ing a positive amount of punishment (see Table B5). For example, second
movers who were punished at least once reported significantly more anger
than those who were never punished (p = 0.01).17 We further investigate
the effect of punishment on anger through a regression. We estimate anger
among second movers who received a positive amount of punishment using
demographic variables and three variables capturing the interaction between
the amount of punishment and the amount returned. The regression is avail-
able in Table C2. We find that higher amounts of punishment trigger higher
intensities of anger. Furthermore, the increase in anger is bigger when the
second mover returns a high amount.18 This is understandable given that the
more a second mover returns, the more undeserved is the punishment.
The clearest trigger of high intensities of guilt is acting selfishly. Second
movers who returned 150 points reported lower intensities of guilt than those
who transferred less (p = 0.02).19 If anticipated, this type of emotional reac-
tion supports the idea that some individuals will not act selfishly in order to
avoid feelings of guilt. We do not find, however, a difference between the in-
tensity of guilt reported by second movers who returned 50 points and those
who returned 0 points (p = 0.53).
Interestingly, punishment does not seem to influence the intensity of guilt
experienced by second movers. For example, among second movers who
returned less than 150, there is no significant difference between the amount
of guilt reported by those who were punished and by those who were not
(p = 0.58).20
We do not find that, for a given transferred amount, fairness perceptions
influence the intensity of guilt. However, we do find that second movers
who thought it is unfair to return low amounts transferred significantly more
than those who thought that it is fair to return low amounts (117.5 vs. 59.4,
p < 0.01). Hence, the apparent disconnection between guilt and fairness
perceptions might be due to the correlation between fairness perceptions and
the amount returned. A possible explanation for this is that fair-minded
second movers feel more guilt when transferring a low amount. Hence, they
return a high amount in order to avoid high intensities of guilt. The following
result summarizes the findings concerning guilt.
Result 3: Second movers who retaliate do so because they are angry and
do not feel guilt. In addition, following the feeling of guilt, second movers are
more likely to rectify selfish behaviour. High intensities of anger are triggered
by punishment, especially if the second mover had returned a high amount.
High intensities of guilt are triggered by selfish behaviour and are not affected
by punishment.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that a realistic punishment institution, in which
multiple rounds of punishment and retaliation are possible, is an effective tool
for the support of cooperative behaviour. However, retaliation is commonly
observed and can result in an extreme reduction of the payoffs of the involved
individuals. We further confirmed that anger-like emotions are an important
motivation for punishment. Selfish behaviour induces anger in others and
thus increases the likelihood of being punished. Finally, we showed that the
experience of prosocial emotions, namely shame and guilt, restrains angry
individuals from retaliating. Therefore, prosocial emotions can be regarded
as a mechanism adjusting the behavioural reactions of anger.
Many economists acknowledge that emotions are an essential component
of decision making (e.g., Loewenstein, 2000). Knowing which emotions are
at play in a given situation can help us understand why people take certain
actions and help us build more accurate models. These insights can further
point to effects or variables that would have otherwise been ignored. In this
section we discuss some of our findings that illustrate these two points.
As expected, we find that anger motivates individuals to punish oppor-
tunistic behaviour (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). Anger, unlike other
emotions such as envy, is known to be strongly affected by expectations and
the intentionality of an action (Haidt, 2003). This helps explain why punish-
ment increases the more unexpected the opportunistic act is (Ben-Shakhar
et al., 2007), and decreases if the action was unintentional (Falk et al., 2008;
Charness and Levine, 2007). In fact, our results show that unfulfilled expecta-
tions can be as important for punishment as fairness concerns. In economics,
expectations are usually assumed to affect behaviour only if the uncertainty
remains unresolved. However, our results indicate that for punishment, this
is not be the case (see also, Reuben and van Winden, 2008). Note that, if
anger had not been associated to punishment by previous research, this role
of expectations might have been overlooked.
Another characteristic of anger is that its action tendency is to attack
even if triggered by unfair behaviour (Lazarus, 1991). An individual who
experiences unfairness (e.g. a deviation from an equality or maximin norm)
can have various reasons to punish the initiator of the unfair action. One
reason could be to correct the resulting unfair material outcome (e.g. by
equalizing payoffs). A second one could be to try to alter the future behaviour
of the norm transgressor by teaching him that acting unfairly does not pay.
Lastly, a third reason to punish could simply be to harm the other party
(anger-induced punishment indeed seems to give pleasure to the punisher,
Quervain et al., 2004). Although all three reasons might be present, only the
third is easy to reconcile with an excessive use of punishment. For example,
if first movers who got back 50 points used punishment to equalize payoffs
or to make the selfish action unprofitable, then they should not punish more
than 266.67 or 100 points respectively.21 However, of the first movers who
punished at least once in this situation, 31.3% did so by more than 266.67
points and 81.3% by more than 100 points. Thus, restricting anger-induced
punishment in settings similar to this experiment might be desirable as its
shown in this paper, its excessive use can lead to retaliation from punished
individuals and to further destruction of resources.22 In this sense, outcome
based models of social preferences such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) miss an important characteristic of punishment
behaviour.
An important and yet overlooked aspect of punishment is the emotional
reaction of the punished. As was shown in this paper, prosocial emotions such
as guilt play a crucial role for the enforcement of social norms. In Section 3 we
have shown that feeling guilty helps explain why some individuals who acted
selfishly adjust their behaviour whereas others do not. It has been observed
that in public good games, the use of non-monetary punishment has a positive
effect on contribution levels.23 Non-monetary punishment has the desirable
property that it can affect behaviour without destroying resources. However,
as shown by Noussair and Tucker (2005), the lack of real consequences for
free-riders makes this effect deteriorate over time. This suggests that the
effect of guilt is not very strong when punishment is only symbolic. Our
results indicate that it is the combination of feeling guilty and receiving
monetary punishment that has a significant effect on behaviour. In this
sense, the best performing punishment institution might be one in which
both symbolic and monetary punishments are available (Noussair and Tucker,
2005).
Another essential role for guilt is the prevention of retaliation by punished
individuals. As we stated in Result 3, even if individuals acted unkindly, they
still feel angry when they are punished. However, it is only those individuals
who are angry and do not feel guilty that decide to retaliate. Therefore, if it
were not for some individuals experiencing guilt, retaliation would be much
more common and punishment of selfish behaviour much more costly. For
example, if second movers who felt guilty had behaved as second movers who
did not feel guilty (controlling for anger) then retaliation would have been
69.8% more frequent and 72.4% higher. Furthermore, the decrease in the
amount returned from part 1 to part 2 would have been 42.2% more severe.
Social emotions like guilt are thus essential for the effectiveness of a pun-
ishment institution. This fits the assumption that social emotions coevolved
with institutions and anger-like emotions to limit antisocial actions (Bowles
and Gintis, 2005).24 An interesting question for further exploration is the
specific evolutionary mechanisms that lead to this situation.
Shame and guilt are both ‘self-reproach’ emotions elicited by the individ-
uals’ own blameworthy actions (Ortony et al., 1988). This study was not
designed to differentiate between the effects of these two emotions. However,
we should note that the emotions’ action tendencies are different (Tangney
and Dearing, 2002). Guilt is related to the blameworthiness of an act and
is thus more likely to result in reparation and action. Shame is related to
a devaluation of the self and is more likely to result in avoidance of further
contact.25 Knowing which emotion dominates can be important. For exam-
ple increasing feelings of shame (e.g. through framing) does not necessarily
lead to an increase in prosocial behaviour. If individuals are given the pos-
sibility to avoid contact altogether, they might prefer to do so instead of
participating in an activity where feelings of shame ‘force’ them to act proso-
cially (Lazear et al., 2006). Finally, already the anticipation of shame and
guilt might induce norm-abiding behaviour.
In economics, most of the emphasis on emotions has been given to their
causes and valence (Zeelenberg and Pieters, 2006). That is, the triggers of
emotional reactions and whether emotions increase or decrease utility. How-
ever, emotions are a more complex phenomenon. As we showed in this paper,
it is also important to take the emotions’ action tendencies into account. Neg-
ative emotions such as guilt and anger can both be considered to decrease
utility, but at the same time they produce very different behaviours. The
study of how specific emotions and their action tendencies affect individ-
ual behaviour can greatly increase our understanding of economic decision
making.
Footnotes
1. Players can have negative earnings if by assigning punishment points to
another player they reduce their own earnings below zero. This way subjects
cannot avoid punishment or retaliation by reducing the earnings of others
to zero. A show-up fee was given to cover any losses incurred during the
experiment.
2. For example, using the same assumptions they use about the distri-
bution of types, the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predicts that in the
case of no punishment 40% of second movers return 150 points. In this situ-
ation only 30% of first movers cooperate (the other 70% prefers to avoid the
chance of ending up with extremely disadvantageous inequality). In the case
of punishment, there are enough first movers that would punish so that all
second movers return 150 points and hence all first movers cooperate.
3. Nikiforakis (2008) studies punishment in a public good game in which
retaliation was possible, but in which the punishment phase ends automati-
cally after retaliation. Furthermore, various bargaining games have a similar
punishment structure (e.g. rejections in alternating bargaining games see,
Binmore et al., 1989, 1991). However, in these cases punishment is less in-
tuitive as subjects generally make new offers after a rejection decision (this
makes the cost of punishment unclear and in some cases not even positive).
4. From: 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “very intensely”; see Appendix A.
5. An extreme case is patients whose brain hemispheres are separated
and therefore one side might not be aware of the motivations of the other
(LeDoux, 1996).
6. Participants had to read and contemplate guilt-inducing phrases and
were later asked to rate on a six-point scale how guilty they felt.
7. Throughout the paper, unless it is otherwise noted, we use two-sided
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. We use each subject as an independent ob-
servation for tests concerning either part 1 or part 2. If we combine the data
of both parts, we first calculate for each subject the mean for the variable in
question and then compute the test using these means as the independent
observations. There are subjects from whom we have, for various variables,
data from only one of the parts (e.g. a second mover who faces a first mover
who cooperates in part 1 and a first mover who defects in part 2). In these
cases, we take the data from the part for which we have information as that
subject’s mean.
8. Subjects in the baseline treatment are indeed very optimistic. They
expected a return of 31.8 points more than the one they actually got. In the
punishment treatment, subjects expected a return of 3.4 points less than the
one they got.
9. We only observe one case in which the second mover retaliated once
again (p22 > 0). However, this is because in all the other pairs where the first
mover punished a second time (p12 > 0), the first mover ended up with zero
points or less and hence the punishment stage ended automatically. We also
observe only one case in which a second mover was punished for returning
150 points (for similar behaviour see, Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Ga¨chter and
Herrmann, 2006). In this case further rounds of retaliation and additional
punishment lead to both subjects receiving 0 points.
10. This tendency to retaliate against punishers could be the reason why
we see ‘perverse’ punishment in public good games (Cinyabuguma et al.,
2006). In other words some low contributors might punish high contributors
because they expect to be punished by them.
11. We also find that retaliation does not depend on the amount trans-
ferred. There is no significant difference between second movers who returned
50 points and those who returned 0 points (p > 0.55).
12. The only case in which second movers cannot retaliate after being
punished occurs when first movers who get back 0 points spend all of their
earnings punishing the second mover. In this case, both subjects end up
with 0 points and no further retaliation is possible. Overall, this occurred in
24.3% of the cases in which there was positive punishment.
13. In public good settings, punishment stops sustaining cooperation
when the cost of punishing increases over 0.500 per point reduced (Nikiforakis
and Normann, forthcoming).
14. The table reports the results for the emotional response of first movers
to the amount returned and for the emotional response of second movers to
the amount of punishment. In both cases, we use orthogonal varimax rota-
tion. Results do not vary significantly if we combine the emotional response
of first and second movers or if we use other rotation methods.
15. The interpretation of the third factor is less clear. For first movers
it represents mostly surprise, and for second movers it is a combination of
gratitude and happiness.
16. Throughout the paper, we refer to a person feeling ‘angry’ if the
reported value for anger was above the median, and as feeling ‘not angry’ if
the value was below or equal to the median. The same is true in the case of
guilt.
17. This is also true if we test only among second movers who returned
less than 150 points (p = 0.01).
18. We use three variables Ir with r ∈ {0, 50, 150}. Ir = 0 if the amount
returned was different from r, and Ir = the amount of punishment received
if the amount returned was r. We obtain positive and significant coefficients
for I0, I50, and I150 (p < 0.02) with the coefficient for I0 being the smallest
and the one for I150 being the largest. The coefficient of I150 is significantly
different from those of I0 and I50 (Wald tests, p < 0.01). The coefficient of
I50 is higher but not significantly different from the coefficient of I0 (Wald
test, p = 0.21). See Table C2 for details.
19. This result is not driven by the different punishment rates faced
by subjects who returned 150 points and by those who returned less. For
example, second movers who returned 150 points and were not punished
felt lower intensities of guilt than second movers who returned less than 150
points and were not punished (p = 0.01).
20. The lack of a significant relationship between guilt and punishment
could be due guilt being affected only in certain circumstances. Punishment
might have little effect on guilt among individuals that felt little guilt before
being punished, and a larger effect on individuals that where already feeling
guilty. However, exploring this would require the measurement of guilt before
and after punishment, which we did not do.
21. If the first mover knows there are people who do not punish, then he
must punish more in order to make the second mover’s action unprofitable on
average. Given the frequency of punishment in the experiment this amounts
to punishing by 168.6 points.
22. In this respect, punishment by an unaffected third party might be
better. If observing a norm violation (as opposed to experiencing it) triggers
less anger but retains the desire to correct unfair behaviour, then punishment
is less likely to be disproportionate to the norm violation. This is in line
with research that finds third party punishment to be less severe (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2004; Carpenter and Matthews, 2005).
23. For instance, Masclet et al. (2003) use symbolic punishment points
and find that, in the short run, they work almost as well as real punishment
points. Barr (2001) reports that the public blaming of the free-rider can
increase cooperation in future rounds.
24. Although some social emotions such as empathy have been docu-
mented among animals (Preston and de Waal, 2002), guilt and shame are
still considered to be characteristic human emotions (see, Kagan, 2004).
25. Economists usually distinguish shame and guilt by the visibility of
behaviour. Shame is said to be triggered in social situations in which actions
are seen by others, whereas guilt is more related to internalized values and
hence is not influenced by the presence of others (e.g., Kandel and Lazear,
1992). However, research by psychologists has shown that people feel shame
even when their actions are unobserved (Tangney et al., 1996), and that
the experience of guilt varies considerably depending on the interpersonal
context (Baumeister et al., 1994).
A Experimental Procedures and Instructions
A.1 Experimental Procedures
The computerized experiment was conducted in March 2005 in the CREED
laboratory at the University of Amsterdam. Subjects were recruited through
the CREED recruitment website and the experiment was programmed with
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes
and the average earnings, including a 1 euro showup fee, were 10.55 euros
(30 experimental points equalled 1 euro).
Each subject played twice the social dilemma game described in Section 1.
We used a perfect strangers matching protocol to avoid reputation effects. In
total, 26 subjects participated in the baseline treatment, without punishment
opportunities. The remaining 136 subjects participated in the punishment
treatment.
After arrival in the reception room, subjects were randomly assigned to
a desk in the laboratory. Once everyone was seated, subjects were given
the instructions for the experiment (see below). Subjects were told that
the experiment consisted of two independent parts. We emphasized the fact
that they will interact with different individuals in each part, and that, their
choices in the first part will not affect their earnings in the second part. Af-
ter this, the one-shot social dilemma game was described as the first part
of the experiment. Once all subjects finished reading the instructions, they
answered a few questions to ensure their understanding of the game. Subse-
quently, the subjects played the social dilemma game via the computer (part
1). At the end of the first part, instructions were distributed concerning the
second part of the experiment. Subjects were told they would be in the same
position as in the first part (i.e. first or second mover), and with certainty,
their partner would be different partner from the one they had played with
in the first part. After they finished the second part (part 2), subjects filled
in a debriefing questionnaire. Thereafter, they were paid their earnings in
private and dismissed.
A.2 Instructions
These are the instructions for first movers in the punishment treatment. The
instructions for second movers and for the baseline treatment are available
upon request.
A.2.1 Instructions for Part 1
There are two types of participants in this part, participants A and partic-
ipants B. Half of the persons participating in the experiment will be in the
role of participant A, and the other half in that of participant B. You are a
participant A.
In part 1 of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned a participant
B. During this part, you will interact only with this participant B. Moreover,
you will not interact again with this participant in part 2 of the experiment.
Part 1 consists of three steps. In step one, you must decide whether you will
transfer points to participant B or if you will retain the points for yourself.
In step two, participant B will decide if he will transfer points to you or if
he will keep them himself. In step three, both of you must again make a
decision. There are various options in step three, which will be explained
below. We will also describe the exact experimental procedure on the next
pages.
A.2.2 Procedure for the Three Steps
At the beginning of part 1 you and participant B will each receive 100 points
as earnings.
Step one: At the beginning of the first step you will receive 50 decision
points. Participant B will receive no decision points. In step one, you must
decide whether you want to transfer your 50 decision points to participant B
or transfer no points to participant B. If you transfer the 50 points, they will
be multiplied by six, meaning that participant B will receive 6 × 50 = 300
points. Then, step two begins. If you decide to transfer nothing part 1 will
end here.
Step two: In step two, participant B has to decide whether he will transfer
150, 50 or 0 points to you. You will then receive exactly the number of points
B transferred.
Therefore, four possibilities exist after the first two steps:
1. You retain your decision points: your additional earnings = 50 points,
B’s additional earnings = 0 points.
2. You transfer your decision points and B transfers 150 points: your
additional earnings = 150 points, B’s additional earnings = 150 points.
3. You transfer your decision points and B transfers 50 points: your
additional earnings = 50 points, B’s additional earnings = 250 points.
4. You transfer your decision points and B transfers nothing: your addi-
tional earnings = 0 points, B’s additional earnings = 300 points.
Hence, after step two your total earnings will be: 100 + the additional
earnings indicated above.
Step three: In step three, you will be informed how many points partici-
pant B transferred to you. Now, you can assign penalty points to participant
B. The assignment of penalty points has financial consequences for both par-
ticipants, A and B. Each penalty point which you assign costs you one point,
while four points are deducted from your participant B. If you assign three
penalty points to participant B, this will cost you three points and participant
B will have twelve points deducted.
You cannot deduct more points from participant B than his total earnings
in that part (i.e. 100 + B’s additional earnings). If participant B has 250
points after step 2, then with your assignment of penalty points you can
reduce his earnings by at most 250 points. Hence, as long as your participant
B has positive earnings, you can assign him as many penalty points as you
want. You can also assign him no penalty points.
Participant B will then be informed how many penalty points you assigned
him and how many points were deducted from his earnings. If you decided
not to assign penalty points, part 1 will end here. If you assigned penalty
points to participant B, he can decide to assign penalty points to you. The
assignment of penalty points has the same financial consequences as described
above. Each penalty point that participant B assigns to you costs him one
point, while four points are deducted from your earnings. You can not be
deducted more points than the total earnings you own at that moment. If
participant B decides to assign no penalty points to you, part 1 will end here.
Note: Participant B can assign penalty points even if his earnings at that
point are zero. If he does so, he will lose points in part 1 of the experiment.
If participant B assigned you penalty points, you and participant B will
have the option to assign penalty points to each other in turns. Part 1 will
end when either you or participant B decides to assign no penalty points, or
if either you or participant B can not be assigned penalty points because your
or his earnings are zero or less. In other words, as long as one of you assigns
a positive amount of penalty points, the other will have the opportunity to
assign penalty points back. Note that, you will be able to assign penalty
points even if your earnings at that point are zero. Furthermore, you cannot
be assigned penalty points if your own earnings are zero.
A.2.3 Finally
Remember that, you participate in part 1 only once. Therefore consider your
decisions carefully. At the end of part 1 you will receive instructions for part
2 of the experiment.
A.2.4 Instructions for Part 2
We will now give you the instructions for part 2 of the experiment.
Also in this part there will be two types of participants, participants A
and participants B. Every person participating in the experiment will be in
the role they had in part 1. Therefore, you are a participant A. As in part
1 you will be randomly assigned a participant B. During this part, you will
interact only with this participant B. You can be certain that this participant
B is not the same person as in part 1.
This part will consist of the same three steps as part 1. Therefore exactly
the same instructions apply for part 2 as for part 1. Remember that you will
participate in this part only once. Therefore consider your decisions carefully.
A.3 Examples of questions in the self-reports
To measure emotions : “Indicate how intensely you feel each of the following
emotions right now, after knowing the amount that B transferred to you?”
The subject then filled in a series of seven-point scales that ranged from ‘not
at all’ (1) to ‘very intensely’ (7).
To measure expectations : “Player A can now assign you penalty points.
How many penalty points do you think A will assign to you?” The subject
then entered a point estimate.
To measure fairness perceptions : “Suppose that participant A transfers
the 50 decision points to participant B. Participant B has to choose to transfer
back either 150 points, 50 points or 0 points. In your opinion, how fair do
you believe is each of these choices: If participant B transfers back 150 (50,
0) points this choice is ... ?” The subject then filled in three seven-point
scales (one for each choice) that ranged from ‘very unfair’ (1) to ‘very fair’
(7).
B Descriptive Statistics
Table B1 and B2 summarize the behavioural data for the punishment and
baseline treatments respectively. Statistics are presented for each part sepa-
rately and averaged. To be precise, the last column displays the average of
the mean behaviour of each subject across both parts (first we take the mean
behaviour across parts for each subject and then we take the mean across
all subjects). In the cases where a subject had only one action, we take the
data from that part as that subject’s mean.
– Table B1 about here –
– Table B2 about here –
Tables B3 and B4 show the emotional reaction of first movers in the
punishment treatment. In the baseline treatment, the emotional reaction of
first movers was statistically indistinguishable from the one in the punishment
treatment. The emotional reaction of second movers is summarized in Table
B5.
– Table B3 about here –
– Table B4 about here –
– Table B5 about here –
C Additional Data Analysis
Table C1 presents a model estimating the intensity of anger experienced
by first movers after they observed the amount of points returned by the
second mover in the punishment treatment. Ordered probit estimates using
robust standard errors and clustering on each subject. Note that in the
regression we take into account the effect of perceived fairness norms, by
estimating the models using the variable ‘Fairness of returning 50 points’.
The reason for this is that this variable exhibited the most variance among
the three variables measuring fairness perceptions. For the variable ‘Fairness
of returning 150 points’, 85.3% of subjects agreed that is was very fair. For
the variable ‘Fairness of returning 0 points’, 83.1% of subjects agreed that
is was very unfair. The coefficients of ‘Return = 50’ and ‘Return = 0’ are
significantly different from each other (Wald test, p = 0.05). That is, anger
is higher when the return is 0 points.
– Table C1 about here –
Table C2 presents a model estimating the intensity of anger experienced
by second movers who received a positive amount of punishment. Ordered
probit estimates using robust standard errors and clustering on each subject.
– Table C2 about here –
The coefficient of the variable ‘Punishment if Return = 150’ is signifi-
cantly different from those of ‘Punishment if Return = 50’ and ‘Punishment
if Return = 0’ (Wald tests, p < 0.01). This indicates that second movers get
angrier if they are punished for transferring a high amount. The coefficient
of ‘Punishment if Return = 50’ is higher but not significantly different from
the coefficient of ‘Punishment if Return = 0’ (Wald test, p = 0.21).
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Table 1
Factors underlying the subjects’ emotional response
First Movers Second Movers
Factors 1st 2nd 3rd 1− h2 1st 2nd 3rd 1− h2
Explained variance 0.83 0.18 0.13 - 0.65 0.34 0.15 -
Factor loadings
Anger 0.85 0.18 0.07 0.23 0.89 0.23 -0.09 0.15
Irritation 0.90 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.86 0.18 -0.13 0.21
Happiness -0.84 -0.10 0.28 0.21 -0.57 0.05 0.49 0.43
Gratitude -0.67 -0.04 0.33 0.44 -0.22 0.25 0.51 0.63
Shame 0.33 0.54 0.04 0.59 0.27 0.72 0.08 0.40
Guilt 0.18 0.53 -0.04 0.69 0.23 0.71 0.07 0.43
Surprise -0.07 0.03 0.50 0.74 0.57 0.24 0.09 0.61
KMO test = 0.78 KMO test = 0.74
Table B1
Summary of the behavioural data in the punishment treatment
Part 1 Part 2 Both
Cooperation by first movers
Number of observations 68 68 68
Frequency of cooperation 86.4 86.4 86.4
Mean points sent (cooperation) 43.4 43.4 43.4
(standard deviation) (17.1) (17.1) (14.7)
Returns by second movers
Number of observations 59 59 66
Frequency of returning 150 0.644 0.559 0.614
Frequency of returning 50 0.237 0.254 0.227
Frequency of returning 0 0.119 0.186 0.159
Mean points returned 108.5 96.6 103.4
(standard deviation) (58.1) (62.9) (57.5)
Punishment by first movers
Number of observations 59 59 63
Frequency of punishment 0.305 0.254 0.278
Mean punishment points 17.3 18.7 18.1
(standard deviation) (31.4) (35.5) (26.2)
Retaliation by second movers
Number of observations 16 9 20
Frequency of retaliation 0.375 0.444 0.400
Mean retaliation points 5.5 5.9 5.2
(standard deviation) (8.7) (10.0) (8.2)
Additional punishment by first movers
Number of observations 5 4 9
Frequency of additional punishment 0.600 0.500 0.556
Mean additional punishment points 6.2 24.3 14.2
(standard deviation) (8.8) (28.0) (20.6)
Table B2
Summary of the behavioural data in the baseline treatment
Part 1 Part 2 Both
Cooperation by first movers
Number of observations 13 13 13
Frequency of cooperation 84.6 46.2 65.4
Mean points sent (cooperation) 42.3 23.1 32.7
(standard deviation) (18.8) (25.9) (15.8)
Returns by second movers
Number of observations 11 6 12
Frequency of returning 150 0.182 0.167 0.167
Frequency of returning 50 0.182 0.333 0.208
Frequency of returning 0 0.636 0.500 0.625
Mean points returned 36.4 41.7 35.4
(standard deviation) (59.5) (58.5) (56.9)
Table B3
Emotional reaction of first movers to returns (punishment treatment)
Mean Intensity Got back 150 Got back 50 Got back 0
Anger 1.1 4.5 5.8
(standard deviation) (0.5) (1.9) (1.5)
Irritation 1.2 5.0 6.1
(standard deviation) (0.7) (1.5) (1.5)
Happiness 6.1 2.3 1.8
(standard deviation) (1.0) (1.4) (1.1)
Gratitude 4.9 2.4 1.6
(standard deviation) (1.8) (1.7) (1.1)
Shame 1.2 1.9 2.9
(standard deviation) (0.5) (1.6) (2.3)
Guilt 1.1 1.3 1.8
(standard deviation) (0.5) (0.9) (1.7)
Surprise 4.2 3.9 4.5
(standard deviation) (1.6) (1.7) (2.5)
Number of observations 53 27 17
Table B4
Emotional reaction of first movers to received retaliation
Mean Intensity No Retaliation Positive Retaliation
Anger 1.9 3.6
(standard deviation) (1.5) (2.2)
Irritation 2.2 4.7
(standard deviation) (1.7) (2.2)
Happiness 3.4 2.6
(standard deviation) (1.8) (1.3)
Gratitude 2.4 2.7
(standard deviation) (2.0) (1.9)
Shame 2.1 1.5
(standard deviation) (1.3) (0.9)
Guilt 2.1 1.5
(standard deviation) (1.9) (1.1)
Surprise 4.8 2.3
(standard deviation) (1.9) (1.6)
Number of observations 14 10
Table B5
Emotional reaction of second movers to received punishment
Mean Intensity No Punishment Positive Punishment
Anger 1.1 3.7
(standard deviation) (0.8) (1.9)
Irritation 1.3 4.1
(standard deviation) (1.2) (2.3)
Happiness 5.0 2.0
(standard deviation) (1.6) (1.2)
Gratitude 4.0 2.5
(standard deviation) (2.0) (1.5)
Shame 1.2 1.5
(standard deviation) (0.9) (0.9)
Guilt 1.4 1.9
(standard deviation) (1.1) (1.3)
Surprise 2.5 4.6
(standard deviation) (1.9) (2.1)
Number of observations 55 25
Table C1
Ordered probit model estimating first movers’ anger
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p-value
Return = 50 2.648 0.337 0.000
Return = 0 3.352 0.438 0.000
Expected return = 50 -0.368 0.338 0.276
Expected return = 0 -0.891 0.473 0.059
Fairness of returning 50 -0.226 0.115 0.049
Economist -0.043 0.302 0.888
Female -0.322 0.290 0.267
Number of obs. = 118 χ2(7) = 111.03
Log likelihood = -96.765 Prob > χ2 = 0.000
Note: Variables: ‘Return = x’ and ‘Expected return = x’ = 1 if the (expected) return
was x, 0 otherwise; Economist = 1 if economics mayor, 0 otherwise; Female = 1 if female,
0 if male; ‘Fairness of returning 50’ ranges from 1 = ‘very unfair’ to 7 = ‘very fair’.
Table C2
Ordered probit model estimating second movers’ anger
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p-value
Punishment if return = 150 0.208 0.074 0.005
Punishment if return = 50 0.028 0.010 0.004
Punishment if return = 0 0.021 0.008 0.014
Economist -0.107 0.411 0.794
Female 0.735 0.622 0.237
Number of obs. = 33 χ2(5) = 14.18
Log likelihood = -58.228 Prob > χ2 = 0.015
Note: Variables: ‘Punishment if return = x’ equals amount of punishment if the return
was x, 0 otherwise. For other variables see Table C1.
